Laïcité has assumed centre stage in much of the public debate in France over a little more than a decade. As it retraces the main legal developments that this heightened debate has triggered, the present article underlines the radical transformation the French constitutional principle has undergone. It insists that the principle has assumed a meaning that radically contrasts with its Republican articulation in the law of 1905: it now applies to private individuals (and no longer commands only public authorities), has come to being equated with a commandment of religious neutrality (whereas it did not for most of the twentieth century) and is mainly applied to (if not targeted at) Muslim women. For all these reasons, it is argued that French laïcité can no longer be coined 'liberal'. K E Y W OR D S : right to freedom of religion, non
INTRODUCTION
Controversies over the scope and meaning of laïcité [secularism] 1 in France abound. Politically, the theme has become a rallying point for a number of forces who wish to turn it into a purportedly 'anti-communitarian' device and a yardstick for forms of 'republican integration' that ought to govern access to a number of public services (schools, hospitals and so on), employment and, ultimately, citizenship and nationality.
2 On 20 March 2016, a new political movement was launched-le printemps républicain-whose aim, with the prospect of the 2017 presidential election, is to reaffirm the centrality of laïcité in the very definition of the French political * Professor of Public Law, University of Paris Nanterre. Unless otherwise stated, all translations from French to English are the author's own. 1 The term 'secularism' is an acceptable translation for 'laïcité' in lay parlance; however, because the present article deals with the redefinition of the legal regime of laïcité, I will use the French word throughout. community. Over the past years, governments on the right and on the left have expressed their support for a 'demanding' view of laïcité. After the 2010 Government of François Fillon passed the burqa ban, 3 the 2014 Government led by Manuel Valls regularly opposed liberal understandings of laïcité-including in terms that trigger much concern and unrest. 4 To be sure, the relationships between the state and religions are a vexed theme in many contemporary societies; there are, however, at least two features of the contemporary shaping of the debate in France that make it quite unique. First, tensions around laïcité have been ever increasing for the past decade or so, currently reaching a dramatic intensity that is only mildly illustrated by the controversy over the 30 or so burkini bans that spread over France's beach towns over the summer of 2016. 5 Secondly, these tensions are not solely or even essentially political in nature. Quite to the contrary, much of what has happened on the issue of laïcité since the mid-2000s has taken the form of legal evolutions: since the middle of the 2000s, it is laïcité's legal regime that has undergone sweeping evolution.
For most of the twentieth century, laïcité as a legal principle had essentially been understood to generate obligations for public authorities only-and, conversely, rights for private individuals. 6 This understanding translated into legal rules requiring public authorities to stick to strict religious neutrality, whereas private individuals were guaranteed freedom of conscience as well as freedom of religion. In 2009, historian Patrick Weil published an influential paper entitled: 'Why the French laïcité is liberal'.
7 A much-respected scholar of nationality and immigration, Weil had also been a member of the 2003 Stasi Commission that recommended, among other things, that ostentatious religious symbols be banned in public schools. Among the arguments that were put forth by Weil in his 2009 paper were the fact that the French law of 1905 on the separation between churches and the state is not hostile to religion, and that the French regime of laïcité did include and indeed protect the right to practice one's religion (since the obligation on religious neutrality only weighed on the state and its representatives). Therefore, even the 2004 ban on religious symbols in public schools could be read through a liberal lens since, in his view, it was not premised on an understanding of the veil as a symbol of women's oppression but rather on documented instances of pressure on women that came along with violence and trouble for public peace and tranquility. Nor did the 2004 ban endow the state with the right to interpret religious symbols or threaten the existence of different spheres governed by different principles-and notably, that of the existence of a public sphere in which all kinds of beliefs can be expressed.
To be sure, many of the more recent developments of the French legal regime of laïcité have outdated Weil's 2009 assessment. For at least a decade, the legal principle of laïcité has increasingly been interpreted as generating obligations of religious neutrality for individuals and, whereas it once encompassed religious freedom, it now increasingly serves as a legal ground for curtailing it. In fact, developments have been so sweeping that one might describe the current state of the law as new laïcité, so as to underline the actual subversion of the original meaning of the principle. 8 In fact, all these elements, and others, have pushed authors such as Weil 9 to intervene and express their criticism of the undue restrictions on freedom of religion that recent reinterpretations of the principle of laïcité have brought about. Addressing the question of whether French laïcité can still be coined 'liberal', the present article answers that question negatively: contemporary French laïcité has illiberal dimensions, as it is increasingly defined as the antonym of religious freedom-as a potentially valid legal ground for various restrictions to religious freedom. Additionally, as the detail of many of the developments that have extended the scope of laïcité as a legal principle over the course of the last decade demonstrates, they are tightly tied to increasing anxieties vis-a-vis Islam. Unsurprisingly then, there is an arguably discriminatory impact of new Laïcité. This however raises a question that is particularly important to lawyers and others who are committed to human rights: where have the judges gone (or more generally for that matter, legal checks and balances)? If rule of law democracies are political regimes in which fundamental rights are guaranteed against political/majoritarian encroachment, one then wonders how, if at all, these processes have constrained and limited the shift to new laïcité in France.
This article first reflects in Part 1 on one particular judicial saga-the Baby Loup case-that caused much turmoil in France from 2010 to 2014 as it raised the question of whether a woman employed in a day-care facility could be dismissed because of her refusal to comply with the internal staff policy of religious neutrality. Indeed, the Baby Loup case encapsulates most of the dimensions of the current legal debates around laïcité. The litigation needs, however, to be read against a wider context that turned it into a nationwide and tense debate. In that respect, the article also aims in Part 2 at analysing the broader developments in the legal regime of laïcité over the past decade. Providing the bigger picture of the shift from laïcité to new laïcité allows one to question its illiberal and discriminatory dimensions-an agenda that is all the more pressing given that neither the national nor European courts seem, so far, to have chosen a very incisive route as they sit on the deferent side of judicial review.
PART 1:THE BABY LOUP AFFAIR
The Baby Loup litigation unfolded as a five-year long judicial saga that has attracted considerable media attention in France and beyond. Between the first decisions on the discriminatory nature of the dismissal of Ms Afif from her employment in 2010 to the final ruling by the Cour de Cassation in June 2014, numerous social and political actors took sides in this case, debating the admissibility of employers' policies of religious neutrality as well as, more generally, the scope of the principle of laïcité and its role in the preservation and affirmation of the French republican project. In fact, laïcité as a pillar of the French republican project was constantly pitted against the evils of multiculturalism and the atomization of society. Afif's contract of employment is discriminatory on grounds of religion.
A. The Baby Loup Judicial Saga
• Conseil des prud'hommes [Labour Court], 14 December 2010: the crèche has a 'mission of public service' and therefore, the constitutional principle of laïcité applies to employment contracts between the crèche and its employees. Accordingly, religious neutrality can be imposed on non-government employees.
• Appellate Court, 27 October 2011: the argument of the crèche's 'mission of service public' is abandoned, but the internal policy subjecting employees to religious neutrality is upheld (and so is the decision to dismiss Ms Afif). • Appellate Court, 27 November 2013: The Court finds that the crèche's commitment to religious neutrality is akin to a religious belief and thus grants it's an exemption from anti-discrimination law: as the crèche believes that neutrality will allow it to 'transcend multiculturalism', the crèche can require it from its employees. The decision to dismiss Ms Afif is upheld.
• Cour de Cassation, 25 June 2014: the crèche's internal policy of religious neutrality is legal to the extent that, although it rests on a general internal rule [règlement intérieur], it only applies to a small number of people given the organization's small size and because childcare is at stake. Before turning to the legal analysis of these developments, a number of wider elements of the socio-political context in which the case unfolded need to be addressed in order to account for the extraordinary importance that the case has come to have.
B. Placing the Baby Loup Saga in its Wider Socio-political Context
To be sure, the crèche Baby Loup was not any childcare facility; to the contrary, it had a very particular identity and project and these played a crucial role in turning what could have remained a rather ordinary employment law dispute into a true affair, 10 epitomizing much of the French anxieties vis-a-vis issues of multiculturalism and secularism.
11 The Baby Loup crèche was founded with the aim of playing a role 12 Emblematically, it had served as one of the locations for the film La Haine in 1995-a cult movie by Mathieu Kassowitz that narrates 19 consecutive hours in the lives of three friends in their early 20s, who come from immigrant families and live in an impoverished multi-ethnic French housing project, in the aftermath of a riot. 13 In this context, the crèche purported to be not only a day-care facility for children but also a place where women could meet up and experience solidarity beyond their differences. Accordingly, the crèche organized a number of events, meetings, discussions, courses (French reading and writing) and tried to play an active part in the life of the community. Baby Loup also aimed at providing the most extensive and comprehensive forms of assistance to mothers and families and especially working mothers: in a context where unemployment is much of a local plague, it aimed at accompanying and encouraging parents' access to employment by operating 24 hours a day during which children could be dropped off and picked up at any time of day and night.
Furthermore, the dismissed childcare worker was not any employee of the crèche; rather, she was the emblem of the success of the crèche's wider social project. By the end of the 1990s, Ms Afif started benefiting from the actions and support provided by the crèche: she attended courses and training at the crèche, and was encouraged to sit a professional exam to become an accredited childcare provider. She passed the exam and by 1997 became the crèche's deputy director.
14 In 2003, she left her position in order to take parental leave. As she gave birth to several children, she renewed her leave and returned to the crèche in 2008, wearing a headscarf. In the meantime, the crèche had adopted a policy of religious neutrality with which she refused to comply. It is around this contentious issue that she was eventually dismissed from her employment a couple of months later.
All these elements of context illuminate the importance of the Baby Loup case. Because of what it stood for in twenty-first century France, the crèche Baby Loup was a very good candidate for the kind of political cause it was turned into serving: affirming the generosity of the French Republic (the director of the crèche, Ms Baleato, was a naturalized French citizen and a political refugee who had fled Chile), the importance of common goods (education, childcare) and common spaces (the crèche), but also the notion that all of these come along with rules (here, laïcité)-elements that were pitted against a tale of Ms Afif's ingratitude and contempt. Consequently, the Baby Loup case provided a number of social and political actors with an opportunity to advance a wider political agenda of redefining laïcité altogether. All these elements help explain the transformation of the litigation into an affair.
The first feature of the Baby Loup affair was that it was replete with unusual moves by the key actors, many of whom gathered into a wide and relatively heterogeneous coalition in support of the crèche. Some of these actors were institutional, such as Jeannette Bougrab, the then head of the HALDE 15 (the French Equality Body). Some were political, such as Manuel Valls, the current Prime Minister of France who was then the Minister of the Interior, and some were intellectuals, such as, prominently, philosopher Elisabeth Badinter. Interestingly, the mobilization of this coalition was not one that reflected the somewhat classic pattern of intellectuals mobilizing against the state. In fact, the Government itself was at least indirectly involved in the coalition, through the leading role of Bougrab as well as through the multiples commentaries and interventions of members of the Government. Nor did this coalition's mobilization espouse the existing pattern of defending the weak party against the powerful one; quite to the contrary, it took sides with the employer against the dismissed employee. Furthermore, many of these prominent actors dramatized their involvement. Bougrab certainly labelled her involvement in a 'battle' justified by what she described were 'mortal threats' against the Republic. 16 As such, her 'battle' seemingly justified infringements of legal forms and procedures. For instance, the fact that Bougrab chose to personally intervene in the hearings at the Conseil des prud'hommes, 17 was itself quite problematic. As the head of the HALDE, her mission was, in the terms of the law of 2004 that created the Equality Body, to 'help the victims to identify the relevant procedures' with respect to alleged instances of discrimination. 18 Obviously, having the HALDE President testify against an individual's claim to discrimination does not fall under that description. Not to mention the fact that the alleged victim, Ms Afif, had initially filed a complaint to the HALDE, which had found that her firing was discriminatory as based on her religion in a decision of 1 March 2010. 19 It was only after Bougrab was nominated as President of the HALDE a couple of weeks later (23 March 2010) that she decided to re-open the case on the basis of her dissatisfaction with the previous findings-thus causing internal conflict within the HALDE. 20 The intervention of Manuel Valls immediately after the Cour de Cassation (France's highest court) delivered its first ruling in the case, on 19 March 2013, also counts among the many unusual moves triggered by the case.
In its first decision in this case, the Cour de Cassation ruled that the principle of laïcité did not apply to employment relations in the private sector (that are regulated by the Labour Code) and that the firing of Ms Afif was illegal as it rested on an internal rule prescribing religious neutrality that was too broad and imprecise. Informed of the content of the decision while he was attending a session at the National Assembly in his capacity of Minister of the Interior, Mr Valls chose to publically intervene and made a speech in which he expressed his wish to 'temporarily step out of his gubernatorial functions' 21 in order to call for caution as the supreme court had, in his view, 'called laïcité into question'. This gravity and dramatization that underpinned Mr Vall's intervention also resonated with the particular shaping of the case that was being put forth by the intellectual side of the petition claiming that 'the application of laïcité, a constitutional principle of our Republic, was seriously threatened, thus endangering our very ability to live together [le vivre ensemble]'.
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The saliency and social impact of the Baby Loop affair are also exemplified by the frenzy of opinions, memos and reports it triggered. Seemingly, all institutions of the Republic have felt the urge to speak their word on laïcité. The Social, Economic and Environmental Council published an opinion on freedom of religion in the workplace in November 2013, 23 only a couple of months after the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights 24 also had done so. Meanwhile, as it was receiving a number of complaints by which private individuals (often Muslim and, for the most part, Muslim women) alleged situations of discrimination as a number of public institutions (such as schools) denied them access, the new Equality body (Défenseur des droits) felt there was a need for the law of laïcité to be 'clarified', and asked the Conseil d'Etat to precisely describe the extent to which 'public services' can impose religious neutrality on those it deals or works with. The Conseil d'Etat thus published a study in December 2013. 25 Probably feeling that more expertise was needed, newly elected President, François Hollande, decided to create a new advisory body on laïcité-the Observatoire de la laïcité, which delivered an opinion on the Baby Loup case 26 as well as on other issues related to laïcité. that a salesperson in a fashion retail business cannot wear a niqab at work. 37 These are cases, however, in which decisions relating to particular individual employment positions were being challenged. By contrast, it had always been held/ considered that an employer was not allowed to have a general internal rule [règlement intérieur] opposing the expression of employees' religious beliefs. 38 In the Baby Loup case, however, it is precisely the adoption by the crèche of such an internal policy prescribing religious neutrality to all personnel that triggered the lawsuit.
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The legal issues at stake in the Baby Loup litigation evolved overtime. Initially, the crux of the matter had to do with a purported 'mission of public service' of the crèche. 40 The reason the crèche was pleading that is was endowed with such a mission had to do with the very different ways in which the principle of laïcité plays out in the public and private sectors. In the public sector, the consequences of the regime of laïcité are very important. It entails a requirement of religious neutrality for all public buildings and personnel: there can be no religious symbols on display in public buildings (schools, city halls, parliamentary assemblies), 41 and it is forbidden for all civil servants and public agents 42 to wear any ersonnel's freedom of conscience and religion may not hinder the respect of principles of laïcité and neutrality that apply in the exercise of all the activities developed by Baby Loup, on the crèche's premises and in its annexes as well as during exterior activities of the children entrusted to the crèche' [le principe de la liberté de conscience et de religion de chacun des membres du personnel ne peut faire obstacle au respect des principes de laïcité et de neutralité qui s'appliquent dans l'exercice de l'ensemble des activités dévelop-pées par Baby Loup, tant dans les locaux de la crèche ou ses annexes qu'en accompagnement extérieur des enfants confiés a la crèche]. 40 In France, public service missions (state schools, municipal services, public health facilities, etc.) are undertaken by public law entities that are governed by administrative law regulations. It has been settled since the 1930s that private law entities, however, may be associated to the public service, in which case they can also be subject to administrative law. For instance, some of their legal acts may be categorised as being of an administrative nature (thus calling for administrative courts' competence should they be legally challenged). In principle, however, employment contract issues involving private legal entities associated with the public service remain private in nature (that is, governed by the Labour Code and challenged, be it the case, before judicial courts rather than administrative tribunals). 41 This particular derivation of the principle of laïcité was traditionally only seldom put to the test (for the expression of an obligation of political neutrality in a case where the pinning of a separatist flag on a municipal building in Martinique was deemed illegal, see Conseil d'Etat, Case No 259806, Commune de St Anne, 27 July 2005). However, recent tensions around laïcité have increased the momentum around this notion of religious neutrality of public buildings, especially after the decision during the winter of 2014 of several municipalities governed by the National Front to install nativity scenes in the halls of municipal and departmental buildings. As their decision was challenged before the courts, they claimed that nativities were a part of local traditions and were thus not to be construed as religious expression contrary to laïcité. Is French laïcité Still Liberal? 293 religious garb 43 while on professional duty-regardless of the nature of their actual position. 44 In fact, the crèche's argument initially relied in part on the reasoning that because of both its raison d'être (favouring social integration throughout a childcare service that targeted mostly women from poor socio-economic and migratory backgrounds) and the support it received from the local government, the crèche ought to be considered to be a public service-and accordingly allowed to require religious neutrality from its employees. This, however, was a legally weak argument. Although it is possible under French administrative law for private entities to be endowed with a 'mission of public service' and therefore to be attracted, to a certain extent, into the ambit of administrative law, 45 several of the conditions for this specific legal regime to apply were not met. In particular, one of these conditions is for a public authority to be in a position to exert some control over the said mission. Such control can take the form of financial support but also entails some oversight of the organizational structure; for instance, public authorities are generally represented on boards and governance councils of private entities who are endowed with a 'mission of public service'. 46 None of this was present in the case of the Baby Loup crèche. Like a vast majority of private childcare facilities in France, it did benefit from public subsidies; but apart from that indecisive criterion, the crèche was an organization that was private in nature, 47 regulated by common (private) law, and the employment contract it had offered Ms Afif (like all other employees) was clearly governed by the Labour Code-and was thus well beyond the reach of the principle of laïcité in so far as that principle subjects only civil servants and public agents to religious neutrality. f agents of the public service of education enjoy, like all other public agents, freedom of conscience and a protection against all forms of religious-based discrimination in their access to public careers and the unfolding thereof, the principle of laïcité obstructs their right to express their religious beliefs within the public service; to that extent, there are no reasons to distinguish between several categories of agents on the basis of whether they are or are not in charge of teaching responsibilities; it thus follows that a public agent who expresses his/her religious beliefs within the public service, throughout the wearing of a sign that marks his religious affiliation, is a breach of his/her obligations'). firmly clarified that the constitutional principle of laïcité did not apply to (employment) contracts between private persons. 48 The crèche then claimed that its commitment to religious neutrality was so instrumental to its raison d'être that it ought to be granted an exemption from anti-discrimination law akin to that which can be awarded to religious, political or philosophical organizations and associations. In many national legal orders as well as under European law, 49 there exists a special legal status for 'conviction-based entities' such as political parties, religious organizations or companies committed to a particular set of values. It is unclear, however, which organizations premised on neutrality can claim such exemptions, for they have been crafted in order to accommodate positive, substantial beliefs. Arguably, there is something self-contradictory in the argument that neutrality could be protected under legal regimes that are made for actual adherence to any given set of values. 50 However, the Appellate Court of Paris granted this exemption to the crèche, arguing that its commitment to 'transcend[ing] multiculturalism' was genuine and compelling enough that it could ground a policy of religious neutrality for all employees. 51 This line of reasoning was, however, Notwithstanding Article 2(1) and (2), Member States may provide that a difference of treatment which is based on a characteristic related to any of the grounds referred to in Article 1 shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate. See also Article 4(2):
Member States may maintain national legislation in force at the date of adoption of this Directive or provide for future legislation incorporating national practices existing at the date of adoption of this Directive pursuant to which, in the case of occupational activities within churches and other public or private organizations the ethos of which is based on religion or belief, a difference of treatment based on a person's religion or belief shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of these activities or of the context in which they are carried out, a person's religion or belief constitute a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement, having regard to the organization's ethos. This difference of treatment shall be implemented taking account of Member States' constitutional provisions and principles, as well as the general principles of Community law, and should not justify discrimination on another ground. Provided that its provisions are otherwise complied with, this Directive shall thus not prejudice the right of churches and other public or private organizations, the ethos of which is based on religion or belief, acting in conformity with national constitutions and laws, to require individuals working for them to act in good faith and with loyalty to the organization's ethos.
rejected by the Cour de Cassation in the final ruling on the case of 25 June 2014, for the crèche 'was not promoting or defending religious, political or philosophical beliefs but rather, it was developing an action targeted to early childhood in unflavored contexts and aiming at social and profession integration of women'.
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In its final intervention, the Cour de Cassation was thus faced with one remaining facet of the case: was the crèche's internal rule of 15 July 2003 [règlement intérieur] a legally valid basis for the decision to fire Ms Afif-given that the crèche was neither a public service nor conviction-based? Contrary to what it had ruled one year earlier, the Court decided that the crèche's internal rule was admissible. It reached that decision by insisting on two main factors: the crèche's small size and its childcare mission. 53 Despite much sound and fury, it is difficult to see this final ruling as more than a very casuistic decision: because of the Court's insistence on the crèche's small size ('only 18 employees') and its reference to potential contact between the employees and children and their parents, its reach beyond the particulars of the case is uncertain. In fact, politicians seem conscious of the risks associated with any extension of the solution reached in the Baby Loup litigation beyond the particulars of that case, since they soon enough engaged in confirming its substance by means of legislative action. In fact, a draft legislative proposal is currently pending in Parliament that would, should it be passed into law, allow all childcare facilities in the country to require religious neutrality from employees-lest they identify themselves as religious facilities. 54 The Baby Loup case was thus extraordinary in its social and political saliency; legally, its complex and multi-faceted legal dimensions result in much uncertainty as to its actual law-making authority. Much ado about nothing? Probably not. First, because Ms Afif's dismissal was confirmed as legal and non-discriminatory-an epilogue that mattered deeply for the claimant. Secondly, because the case was the emerged part of a deeper iceberg-the salient point of a wider and very powerful movement that has been reshaping laïcité not only politically but also legally over the past decade. In that sense, the extensions of the scope of laïcité that the Baby Loup case eventually confirmed are only some of many more that have been legally endorsed since the mid-2000s.
of the people to whom it targets its actions' and goes on to determine that 'to that extent, the Baby Loup association can be qualified as a "conviction-based company" [une entreprise de conviction] in a position to require its employees' neutrality'. Rather it insists that a relatively stable interpretation of laïcité as a legal principle has prevailed throughout most of the twentieth century and that this interpretation is being increasingly challenged. The modus operandi is the following: whereas laïcité has always generated obligations of religious neutrality, those were long understood to weigh on public authorities only. The 2004 law prohibiting religious symbols in public schools represents a rupture in that perspective, as it is the first legal formalization of obligations of neutrality weighing on private individuals. This breakthrough is all the more important in that it has encouraged many actors to promote extensive interpretations of the 2004 regime-not only inside schools but around schools as well, thus nurturing the idea that laïcité entails religious neutrality in a variety of social settings. To the extent that the past decade can be read as having witnessed a genuine reversal of the meaning of laïcité with respect to private individuals, it no longer serves as a guarantee of religious freedom but as its antonym. Highly significant, from that standpoint, are the ways in which these developments have, so far, gone undisturbed by counter powers: if anything, national judges (including the Conseil constitutionnel) as well as European judges (in particular, those presiding in the European Court of Human Rights) have neither stopped nor mitigated the transformation of France's laïcité regime.
A. Laïcité as an Obligation of Religious Neutrality for Public Authorities
Laïcité is a constitutional principle in France: it is proclaimed in Article 1 of the Constitution of 1958 together with other principles such as the democratic and social nature of the French Republic and the principle of equality before the law. It is not, however, defined by the text of the Constitution; one thus needs to study judicial interpretation thereof to grasp its substantive meaning. The Conseil constitutionnel (CC) for instance has determined that Article 1's reference to laïcité encompasses respect for all beliefs, equality of all citizens before the law as well as a guarantee of the free exercise of religion offered by the Republic. 55 But laïcité also predates the Constitution of the Fifth Republic; and, although it makes no explicit reference to the word, the law of 9 December 1905 on the separation of church and state is generally associated with the elevation of a legal regime of laïcité in France. As it breaks with the former Napoleonic Concordat Article 2 The Republic does not recognize, remunerate or subsidize any religion. In consequence, starting on the 1st of January which follows the publication of this Law, all expenses concerning the practice of religion shall be abolished from the budgets of the state, departments and municipal councils.
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In other words, while it recognizes the right to freedom of religion for individuals (Article 1), the law of 1905 subjects all public authorities to an obligation of neutrality (Article 2). 58 Until recently, this obligation of (religious) neutrality did not extend to private individuals. In a 2004 study entitled One Century of laïcité [Un siècle de laïcité], the Council of State explained that the requirement of neutrality that weighed on public authorities was justified by the fact that it guaranteed the right to freedom of conscience for private individuals who interact with those authorities. 59 It insisted, nevertheless, that private individuals retained the freedom to express their religious beliefs, including in their interactions with public services and authorities. 60 Significantly, at the time this study was published, a rich and consistent body of case law 61 rested on the clear distinction in the legal regimes applicable to students and teachers of state schools: while obligations of strict neutrality weighed on the latter, the formers' freedom to express their faith could not be subjected to limitations other than those commanded by the safeguard of other individuals' freedom. 62 57 Article 2(2) states further: 'However, expenses related to the services of the chaplaincy and intended to ensure the free exercise of religion in public establishments such as secondary schools (lycées and collèges), and primary schools, hospitals, asylums and prisons, may be included in these budgets. The public establishments of religion are abolished, subject to the conditions stipulated in Article 3.' 58 Rather, this is the interpretation that has prevailed of Article 2, which could have been construed to have a solely financial meaning. The distinction has not been sufficiently underlined between students' and teachers' obligations. Because education is laïque, the obligation of neutrality is comprehensively imposed on teachers who may not express their religious faith while teaching. However, because freedom of conscience is the rule, such a principle cannot be imposed on students who are free to manifest their faith, the sole limit to that freedom being others' freedom.'
However, during the 1990s, a twofold movement developed that shortly after led to legislative intervention.
(i) The prohibition of ostentatious religious symbols inside public schools By the end of the 1980s, the wearing of the hijab by young Muslim girls started to be successfully turned into a salient and pressing social problem by a number of social, political and legal actors. 63 This was further compounded by the unfurling of a strong republican discourse insisting on the particular role of public schools in shaping the minds of future citizens, and on the importance of the preservation of the neutrality of educational settings in that perspective. 64 By the time a committee of experts was convened in order to reflect on the appropriate legal answers to a number of conflicts that had been generated between Muslim families and school authorities in several parts of France, it was likely that a ban on wearing the hijab would be proposed. It must be noted, however, that the 2003 Final Report of the Stasi Commission 65 made many recommendations besides the ban on religious symbols in public schools, several of which testified to the notion that the traditional doctrine of state neutrality ought to be revisited in order to be more inclusive. For instance, the Report suggested that the calendar of holidays be amended so as to include holidays from other religious traditions (for instance, Kippour and Aïd el Kebir) in order to distance itself from the Catholic tradition. These proposals, however, were eventually ignored by Parliament.
The passing of the law of 15 March 2004 constitutes a radical reversal of prior law as it commands that 'the wearing of symbols or garb by which students [of public elementary, middle and high schools] ostentatiously manifest a religious belonging is prohibited'. 66 In legal terms, the 2004 law subjects state school students 67 to a new legal regime-a regime of religious neutrality. A little over ten years on, the assessment of the 2004 law's impact features two main elements. The first one is the disproportionate impact it has on Muslim women. The second, correlatively, has to do with the particular issues at stake when deciding what counts as 'religious' garb under the 2004 law.
Although it is difficult to access centralized statistics on the actual application of the law (that is, the number of cases in which school authorities invoke the law in order to ask a student to remove religious symbols), 68 reveal a disproportionate impact on Muslim women. 69 To be sure, the rigours of the law are also applied, occasionally, to non-Muslim students-sikh students, for instance; 70 but these are only an exception to the general rule. Counting the total number of cases that have led to judicial rulings, legal scholar Olivia Bui Xuan claims that, while four of them were brought by sikh male students, 37 had been initiated by Muslim female students-and one of these cases comprised 17 complainants. 71 Another contentious issue related to the application of the 2004 legal regime relates to the definition of what constitutes a 'religious symbol' under the law. In a 2007 ruling, the Council of State upheld an expulsion decision that had been taken against a female student wearing a bandana. 72 In 2013, a similar decision was upheld in a case brought by another student who was reproached for wearing a woollen hat; 73 and in 2013, another case concerned an expulsion decision concerning a skirt that was too long 74 -a skirt recalling the traditional abaya piece of clothing. Anthropologist Talal Asad, in his study of the Report of the Stasi Commission that preceded the adoption of the 2004 law, had underlined the high stakes that would be associated with the determination of 'religious' symbols-and, even more so, ostentatious religious symbols. 75 Subsequent developments have proved how warranted his word of caution was. In fact, it is interesting to underline that although the law, at face value, seems to be based on 'symbols' that are supposed to have a somewhat objective existence, it is increasingly the much more abstract and immaterial behaviour (and interpretations thereof) of Muslim female students to whom the rigours of the law are being opposed. In the bandana case, for instance, the Advocate General acknowledged that it was not a religious symbol; however, he insisted that the intransigence of the student in her refusal to remove it justified it being subsumed under the category of 'ostentatious religious symbols'. Similarly, in cases where long skirts have been at the heart of the conflict, school authorities have based their judgments on the fact that the students were Muslim girls who wore headscarves on their way to school, and only removed them when entering school premises. This behaviour, they felt, allowed them to interpret other parts of the girls' clothing as necessarily similarly endowed with religious meaning-and thus apply the 2004 law to their skirts or gloves. This modus operandi in the application of the law does however place the concerned students in a catch-22 situation: although they make an effort to comply with the law by removing their headscarf before entering their schools, they still face expulsion and other disciplinary measures because of extensive, judicially upheld, interpretations of the law.
Additionally, it is worth noting that the 2004 law was upheld by a number of judicial interventions both at the national and European levels. To be sure, enacting the law constrained administrative courts in France: even though administrative case law had consistently affirmed the existence of pupils' right to express their religious faith at school throughout the 1980s and 1990s, this was no longer an option for administrative courts who are to enforce legality once a new law enters into force. 76 The only possibility of ignoring the new legislative provisions would have entailed administrative courts' ruling that the provisions were contrary to the state's obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). To the contrary, the administrative courts determined that expulsion decisions based on the new legislative understanding of laïcité did not amount to an excessive interference with the right to freedom to manifest one's religion in breach of Article 9 of the ECHR. As for the compatibility of the 2004 law with the French constitution, it was never put to the test, neither before it was promulgated nor since then. In its 2004 ruling pertaining to the compatibility with the French Constitution of the proposed constitutional treaty for the EU, the Conseil did however insist that 'the provisions of Article 1 of the Constitution whereby "France is a secular republic" which forbid persons to profess religious beliefs for the purpose of non-compliance with the common rules governing the relations between public communities and private individuals are thus respected'. 77 Based on the provisions of Article 9 of the ECHR, one would have expected the position of the ECtHR to be more demanding. Article 9 does indeed define religious freedom as encompassing one's freedom to manifest religion both in public and in private. The European Court, however, chose to defer to national traditions and interpretations, especially whenever domestic law subjects particular groups of people to restrictions on religious freedom. School teachers, 78 hospital personnel, 79 pupils 80 and students 81 all fall under possible limitations on their right to express their religious beliefs; and claims of gender-based discrimination have, so far, been rejected. 82 To be sure, the much-noted Eweida and Others ruling of January 
2013
83 marks an important shift in the European Court's approach to Article 9 claims as it clearly abandons the position that employees retain the possibility of freeing themselves from undue restrictions to their freedom of religion by leaving their positions of employment and newly requires private parties to balance all interests and seek to minimize infringements. It would however be mistaken to characterize the ECtHR's approach as one guided by the concept of reasonable accommodation; rather, the national margin of appreciation seems to be the Court's guiding principle. As far as the French 2004 ban on religious symbols in public schools is concerned, it is interesting to note that, even before it entered into force, the Court had found no violation of the Convention in cases where pupils wearing headscarves had been excluded from school because of their refusal to remove them during gymnastics classes. The cases dated back to the late 1990s, and the expulsion decisions were based on the administrative doctrine that, despite the fact that pupils retained the right to express their religious beliefs, punctual and temporary restrictions were legitimate as long as they pursued goals of safety and public order. 84 Requirements to remove veils during physical education or chemistry classes were generally found to fall under those qualifications. On that basis, it was hardly surprising that the Court January 2013. 84 Dogru v France, supra n 80 at para 68: 'The Court observes that the domestic authorities justified the ban on wearing the headscarf during physical education classes on grounds of compliance with the school rules on health, safety and assiduity which were applicable to all pupils without distinction. The courts also observed that, by refusing to remove her headscarf, the applicant had overstepped the limits on the right to express and manifest religious beliefs on the school premises.' 85 Bikramjit Singh v France, supra n70. 86 In fact, the organization Singhs United has engaged in strategic litigation against various aspects of French law that they claim constitute undue restrictions on religious freedom (including the obligation to provide bareheaded photographs in order to be issued with French passports, another case which the ECtHR has ruled inadmissible whereas the UNHRC found French law to be in violation of the ICCPR).
As for the challenge to the 2004 law, the case in which the UNHRC found France to be in violation of the ICCPR concerned a pupil, Bikramjit Singh, who had been expelled from the exact same high school for the exact same reason (wearing a sikh keski) and during the very same academic school year as another pupil, Ranjit Singh, whose application to the ECtHR was declared inadmissible: see Bikramjit Singh v France, ibid. On the parallel readings of the Singh saga, see Bribosia, Caceres and Rorive, supra n 70.
view that not only is the ECtHR's approach particularly deferential to national appreciations of matters, it is also inconsistently so. In particular, scholars have noted that the Court's interpretation of religious freedom varied greatly depending on whether dominant or minority religious views and beliefs were at stake (Islam, in particular).
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Samuel Moyn for example has written that the Court's approach amounted to 'Christian Islamophobia' dressed in the 'principled garb of secularism'. 88 The criticism is a serious one indeed. It not only challenges the epistemological possibility of a sustainable notion of neutrality (and secularism) 89 but also the capacity of bodies, such as the European Court, to be equal to their adjudicatory office.
B. Extending the Interpretation of the Prohibition around Schools
Extensive applications of the 2004 law also occur in several other instances. The growing controversy over the possibility of subjecting parents of state school pupils to an obligation of religious neutrality when they collaborate with school activities is a case in point. Shortly after the 2004 law was passed, some schools undertook to amend their internal rules so as to insert requirements of neutrality applicable to what soon became the category of 'accompanying parents', that is, parents when/if they accompany students on trips and activities outside the school (museum, cinema, sports day and so on). In 2011, a Muslim mother brought a legal challenge against the new rule in her child's school. In the first judicial ruling on the issue, her claim was rejected. The Court reasoned that 'accompanying parents' were 'participants' in the public service of education and could, therefore, be subjected to the realm of laïcité, that is, the obligation of religious neutrality in public services. 90 Soon after the ruling, all schools adopting similar policies received express support from the Minister of Education, who recommended in a nationwide general ministerial instruction that accompanying parents themselves respect in their dress a principle of religious neutrality.
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It is very doubtful that there is a valid legal ground for subjecting parents to any form of religious neutrality. To be sure, the law of 2004 does not apply to parents, as it is expressly stated as only applying to 'pupils of elementary, middle and high schools'. As to the Montreuil court's reasoning that these parents are 'participants' in the public service of education, it is observed that, not only is that category essentially unheard of in general administrative law, the only other instance in which it self-understanding of modernity as more than a mere precursor or a catalyst. Egalitarian universalism, from which sprang the ideas of freedom and social solidarity, of an autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, of the individual morality and conscience, human rights, and democracy, is the direct heir to the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love. This legacy, substantially unchallenged, had been the object of continual critical appropriation and reinterpretation. To this day, there is not alternative to it. And in the light of the current challenges of a post-national constellation, we continue to draw on the substance of this heritage. Everything else is just idle postmodern talk.' 90 TA Montreuil, Case No 1012015, 22 November 2011. Sadly, the claimant was distraught enough by the ruling that she did not appeal it. 91 Circulaire Chatel, 27 March 2012.
was referenced led to exactly the opposite results. In 2001, the Conseil d'Etat did indeed rule that the intervention of Congregationalist sisters wearing a coif inside penitentiary institutions made them 'participants' in the public service; however, their intervention could not be construed as a violation of laïcité, for it was 'exclusive of all proselytism'. 92 By the middle of 2013, the confusion on this issue was such that the French Equality Body (Défenseur des droits) asked the Council of State, in its advisory capacity, to 'clarify' the law. In a study that was released in December of 2013, the Council of State determined that there were no legal grounds for subjecting accompanying parents to a general obligation of religious neutrality when they accompanied school activities, unless there was a particular threat to the public order.
93 By 2014, the new Minister of Education in the Socialist Government, Ms Najat Vallaud Belkacem, made public her position that she opposed her predecessor's policy; Ms Vallaud has not, however, repealed his general instruction. To this day, the situation thus remains uncertain. Nevertheless, the policy is not without social effect. Among many others that are also addressed in this article, this particular policy contributes to the dissemination in the public at large of negative perceptions of religion in general, and Islam in particular. It also encourages the diffusion of the legally ungrounded and politically problematic assumption that all forms of religious expression should be limited to the private sphere.
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Another issue has emerged following extensive of interpretation of the 2004 law: that of its application to young adults enrolled in vocational training programmes. The structure of vocational training in France rests on programmes organized by public institutions called GRETAs. 95 The programmes they organize often take place inside public high schools. By the mid-2000s, several high school principals took the stand that the people enrolled in GRETA programmes could not wear religious symbols or garb while attending training sessions, thus interpreting the 2004 law as applicable to public school buildings rather than to public school students. The matter was referred to the Legal Affairs Department of the Ministry of Education, which wrote a memorandum in 2009 expressing the view that, although the people involved in vocational training programmes could not be considered to be 'students of elementary, middle or high schools' under the law of 2004, it would be a violation of the constitutional equality clause to tolerate the coexistence within public high schools of differently treated groups of users: pupils subjected to the neutrality requirement, and young adults not subject to the neutrality requirement. This violation of the principle of equality would then in turn justify subjecting everyone to the rule, lest there be a threat to the public order inside schools. 96 Here again, the proposed interpretation of the law was a broad one that amounted to subjecting groups of individuals that clearly fell outside of its scope to the legal regime it created. Courts have essentially ruled in a direction opposite to that of the Ministry of Education when confronted with the issue; 97 as has the Equality Body. 98 A recent appellate judgment, however, echoes the Ministry's views. In October 2015, the Paris administrative appellate court determined that because of the fact that specific GRETA training sessions took place inside a public high school, GRETA trainees were bound to 'come across' [rencontrer] high school students, and the simultaneous presence, within a single building, of students subjected to the rule of religious neutrality and of a trainee wearing a headscarf, was capable of causing a threat to the school's public order. 99 This also is an important development, in that such a broad interpretation of the 2004 law creates another category of private individuals who are subjected to the requirement of religious neutrality. the passing of the law consistently referred to the burqa is in itself very interesting. For indeed it is the niqab (in which the face is covered by a veil, but the eyes are seen) and not the burqa (which covers the whole body and face, with the eyes being seen only through a mesh) that has allegedly grown in numbers in contemporary France. Referring to the burqa, however, allows for connotations associated with Taliban extremism in Afghanistan to be imported into the debate. The problem was thus constructed and presented as a problem of foreign origin, not one relating to hic et nunc space at large, which includes the streets, public accommodation and transport and so on.
C. Extending the Prohibition of Religious Symbols

108
Before it was promulgated on 11 October 2010, the bill was referred to the Constitutional Council, which upheld it, but delivered a troubling ruling. 109 In a remarkably short decision, the Constitutional Council ruled that the law prohibiting face covering struck a reasonable balance between the public interest in safeguarding public order on the one hand, and the guarantee of constitutionally protected rights on the other hand. 110 Ironically, it also revealed the legislator's subterfuge in enacting the law in general terms, rather than in the specific terms that it was undoubtedly pursuing (a burqa ban). Indeed, whereas neither the law's official title 111 nor either of its provisions make any reference to religion, religious garb or the veil, the Council deemed it necessary to underline that it should not have the effect of restricting the freedom to exercise one's religion in barring access to and from places of worship.
112 Finally, the decision also contains a sentence that is particularly troubling from the perspective of human rights theory, on at least two counts. First, the Council ruled that individual voluntary behaviour was capable of constituting, in and of itself, violations of the constitutional principles of liberty and equality. Secondly, this particular consideration applies specifically to women-women are, in the Council's words, the individuals whose voluntary decisions are capable of violating constitutional principles.
113
The law of 2010 has also been upheld by the ECtHR. 114 The ruling testifies to the fact that this was a hard case for the Court, and that some of the arguments in favour of the law's incompatibility with European human rights standards were well received at the Court. In particular, the Court's decision conveys the notion that the Sections 1 and 2 of the statute referred for review are intended to respond to practices, which until recently were of an exceptional nature, consisting in concealing the face in the public space. Parliament has felt that such practices are dangerous for public safety and security and fail to comply with the minimum requirements of life in society. It also felt that those women who conceal their face, voluntarily or otherwise, are placed in a situation of exclusion and inferiority patently incompatible with constitutional principles of liberty and equality. When enacting the provisions referred for review, Parliament has completed and generalized rules which previously were reserved for ad hoc situations for the purpose of protecting public order. Government's arguments that the law was justified by public safety concerns were considered by it to be unconvincing and even irritating. 115 Nonetheless, the Court upheld the law by finding there had been no violation of the ECHR in that the French authorities may under European standards consider that 'minimal requirements of social life' and the sheer possibility of a 'shared life' in the community justified the prohibition on concealment of one's face in public. 116 These notions, and their introduction into European human rights law, have and will trigger many questions and criticisms. Within the European Court itself, this particular part of the ruling led to vigorous dissent. In their dissent opinion, Judges Nussberger and J€ aderblom strongly criticized the Court's reliance on the abstract notion of 'living together'. These Judges explained that they 'cannot share the opinion of the majority as, in our view, it sacrifices concrete individual rights guaranteed by the Convention to abstract principles'.
117 Although many considerations relating to the particular position of the ECtHR-both from a structural 118 118 As a supranational court, the ECtHR has consistently put forward the doctrine of subsidiarity, according to which national authorities are, in principle, better positioned to assess the adequate means for the implementation of the Convention and adjust the ensuing requirements to the particulars of any given context. This, however, has not prevented it from delivering a number of bold decisions, many of which have actually contributed to the Court's affirmation as a key player in European multilevel governance in the field of human rights. 119 The ECtHR has been under increasing pressure recently, as several States (among which, notably, the UK) have openly questioned the legitimacy of several of its judgments. While the tension politically culminated in the 2012 Brighton Declaration, it found some legal expression in the amendment to the Convention's preamble that was decided with the signing of Protocol 15 in 2013. The new text insists on the States' margin of appreciation and reaffirms subsidiarity as a foundational principle to the operation of the ECHR as a whole. Some actors from inside the Court have argued that even though Protocol 15 has not yet entered into force, the message has been heard by the Court, which has started to recalibrate aspects of its case law and take a more deferential position vis-a-vis Contracting Parties: see, for instance, Spano, 'Universality or Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity' (2014) 14 Human Rights Law Review 487. 120 S.A.S. v France, supra n 114 at para 161: 'In the present case, while it may be considered that the ban imposed by the Law of 11 October 2010 has specific negative effects on the situation of Muslim women who, for religious reasons, wish to wear the full-face veil in public, this measure has an objective and reasonable justification for the reasons indicated previously.' The said reasons are developed throughout paras 144-159 but not always convincingly. For instance, as the Court acknowledges (at para 151) the fact that 'the impugned ban mainly affects Muslim women who wish to wear the full-face veil . . . it nevertheless finds it to be of some significance that the ban is not expressly based on the religious connotation of the clothing in question but solely on the fact that it conceals the face'. Similarly, the Court reasons that while 'it is certainly understandable that the idea of being prosecuted for concealing one's face in a public place is traumatizing for women who have chosen to wear the full-face veil for reasons related to their beliefs . . . it should nevertheless be taken into account that the sanctions provided for by the Law's drafters are among the lightest that could be envisaged, because they consist of a fine at the rate applying to second-class petty offences (currently 150 euros maximum), with the possibility for the Court to impose, in addition to or instead of the fine, an obligation to follow a citizenship course.' For contrasts with a number of facts. The 2010 law has been in force since April 2011 and available statistics 121 disclose that, between its entry into force and February 2014, a little over 1,000 fully veiled women have been fined and approximately 20 have been subjected to the alternative sentence of 'citizenship training sessions '. 122 It is difficult, however, to assess what impact it has had on the actual practice of the wearing of the niqab in France. 123 Obviously, the law disproportionately impacts upon Muslim women-to an extent that it is arguable that the law is hardly an instance of indirect discrimination for, despite the apparent neutrality of the legal formulation ('no one shall'), its intent was clearly targeted at this particular group within the population. In any event, the prohibition does constitute an unprecedented blanket restriction on a particular manifestation of religious belief.
D. Extending the Prohibition of Religious Symbols Beyond Schools: At Work
Besides the definition of 'the public space' as a space in which individuals (women) can be prohibited from wearing a niqab (not from wearing religious garb in general), the workplace is another space in which the requirements of religious neutrality have made unprecedented inroads over the past few years. The description of the details of the Baby Loup case (see above, Part 1) sketched the general framework of the articulation of religious freedom and employment law, and the extent to which the conflict between the crèche and Ms Afif brought change: although under current law, this solution cannot be said to hold true in general, the case has established that firms and organizations of small size who operate in the field of childcare may adopt internal rules prescribing religious neutrality for all personnel. However, other developments have also been taking place.
In April 2015, the Cour de Cassation referred a case for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that might well lead to the first judicial interpretation by it of the provisions of Article 4(1) of Directive 2000/78 prohibiting religious discrimination in the workplace. 124 The case originated with the dismissal of a Muslim woman by the company that had employed her for a little under a year as . 124 It is striking that the CJEU has not been called upon to interpret the prohibition of religious discrimination pursuant to the Directive in its 15 years of existence. Almost as surprising is the fact that there have been only two cases where race discrimination was at stake. In fact, the prohibition on age discrimination seems to be the one ground of the new set of directives that has triggered most judicial intervention.
Is French laïcité Still Liberal? 309 a computer engineer. Her job entailed being sent for several months at a time on house missions in companies (her employer's clients) to help them install or manage their information technology systems. She wore the veil when she was hired and her employer reports that they had mutually agreed that, should this become an issue at any given point in time, she could be asked to unveil. In May 2009, an important client for whom she had been working onsite reported that her wearing of the veil in the workplace had made several collaborators uncomfortable and asked that no more veiled woman be sent in the future. She was subsequently called for an interview with her supervisors who asked her if she would now agree to cease wearing her veil during assignments. When she refused, her employment was terminated. She took her case to the domestic courts, but both in first instance and on appeal the courts found that the dismissal rested on valid legal grounds and upheld it. When it reached the Cour de Cassation, however, the issue arose whether it was possible to construe customer preference not to be served by persons wearing an Islamic veil as a 'determining occupational requirement' under EU law. The Court decided to refer the question to the CJEU. The question referred is phrased as follows: could encourage the Court to adopt an intersectional approach by addressing the correlated sex and, potentially, race-based dimensions of discrimination.
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Also of interest is the judicial ruling by the Cour de Cassation of 19 March 2013 that dramatically extended the legally admissible scope of obligations of religious neutrality under employment law.
128 Interestingly, because it was delivered the very same day as the first Baby Loup ruling, this judicial fiat has been somewhat obscured and underestimated. The facts of the case were the following: a private organization working for the distribution of social security benefits (and therefore, endowed with a 'mission of public service') decided to fire an employee who was wearing a headscarf. Although the employment contract between the employer and the employee is a contract between two private legal persons normally regulated by the Labour Code, the Court decided to craft an innovative solution according to which the employer's mission of public service cautioned the applicability of the principles of laïcité-and thus, of religious neutrality. Consequently, the decision to fire the employee was upheld. This is a further extension of the scope of religious neutrality of employees under employment law, and a quantitatively important one indeed. Thus far, obligations of religious neutrality in employment law depended essentially on legal status: civil servants and public agents were subjected to neutrality because of the public law nature of their employment positions; whereas employees under private law contracts regulated by the Labour Code, in principle, were not. What the Cour de Cassation 2013 ruling changes is that employees under private law contracts may well be subjected to obligations of neutrality if/when their employers are in charge of a 'mission of public service'. Depending on how strictly or widely this notion will be interpreted in the future, its potential scope is enormous as numerous private companies and organizations employing very large numbers of people are currently associated with the public service-all the more so given that privatization has been the dominant reformatory paradigm public policy over the past decades. Therefore, sanitization companies, waste management companies, school canteens and so on in most municipalities today are likely to be construed as 'private companies endowed with a mission of public service'. Subsequent to the Cour de Cassation's 2013 ruling, all the employees could thus become subjected to an obligation of religious neutrality.
Inside and around schools, but also in the public space at large as well as in an increasing number of cases in the workplace, legally admissible or mandated obligations of religious neutrality have multiplied over the past decade. Indeed, the movement is ongoing: additional draft legislative proposals are regularly registered, including the extension of the prohibition on religious symbols and garb to
